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AN INCREASED ROLE FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION IN ADDRESSING FEDERALISM CONCERNS

Benton Martin
I. INTRODUCTION
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB)-seen by
some as one of the most important pieces of education
legislation in our nation's history 1-is overdue for
reauthorization. 2 Prior attempts at reauthorization have failed
due to political controversy surrounding NCLB, 3 particularly
the extent of the federal role in education. 4 One critic has
1. See, e.f{., Robert A Garda, .Jr., Corning Full Circle: The Journey from Separate
But 8qual to Separate and Unequal Schools, 2 DUKF: J. CONST. L. & !'UH. Pm;y 1, 32
(2007) ("The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB") is the most important piece of
education legislation in the last thirty-five years.").
2. See Sam Dillon, Experts Say a Rewrite of Nation's Main l~ducation Law Will
Be Hard This Year, N.Y. TIMF:S, Jan. 29, 2010, at A18 [hereinafter Dillon Hard
Rewrite], available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/0l/29/education/29child.html
(discussing the chances for a rewrite of NCLB in 2010).
:-1. See Sam Dillon, Court Revives Lawsuit Against No Child Left Behind Law,
N.Y. TIMES, .Jan. 8, 2008, at A18 [hereinafter Dillon Lawsuit], available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01108/education/08child.html (discussing how Congress
was "stymied by partisan strife over the law's renewal"). In October 2011 another bill
was introduced that would overhaul the law. See News From THE SENATE HEALTH,
EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSION COMMITTEE, ELEMENTARY AND SECONDAIW
EDUCATION REAUTHORIZATION ACT: SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS (2011), available at
http://harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/4e915Jf1924d8.pdf. Commentators have do not
have high hopes that the bill will become law, especially with the upcoming election
year. See .Joy Resmovits, Harhin-Enzi No Child Left Behind Bill fi'aces Uncertain
Future, HUFFINGTON PosT, Oct. 27, 2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/1 0/27/harkin-enzi-no-child-left_n_J0:15790.html (commenting that there is
"general belief that a law as sweeping as NCLB is unlikely to be passed after the end of
2011"); Sam Dillon, Senate Panel Approves Bill That Rewrites Education Law, N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
22,
2011,
at
A9,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/10/22/education/22educ.html (reporting that one commentator gave the bill a "5050 chance" of passing before the presidential election).
1. See Dan Lips, Reforming No Child [,eft Behind by Allowing States to Opt Out:
An A-PLUS for Federalism, HERITAGE FOUND. (,June 19, 2007), www.heritage.org/
Research/l{eports/2007/06/Reforming-No-Child-Left-Behind-by-Allowing-States-to-OptOut-An-A-PLUS-for-Federalism (discussing proposals by Republican congressmen to
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referred to NCLB as "the most intrusive federal education
legislation in our nation's history." 5 NCLB indeed ushered in
an expansive federal role in education. But whether this role is
detrimental is debatable.
Federalism addresses the interaction of state governments
with the federal government. 6 This interaction often involves
trade-offs between state and federal power, where courts try to
draw limits on federal power. 7 But NCLB does not fit squarely
into lines traditionally drawn. x Through its spending power,
the federal government is boldly raising its voice in educationY
The states have all accepted this federal role, incorporating
federal goals into their own education plans. 10 The courts have
largely left the issue untouched. 11 The field is thus ripe for new
theories of federalism. 12 Many theories have emerged, mostly
in support of a continued federal role. How a refined view of
federalism should influence legislators looking to reauthorize
NCLB, however, has not been adequately addressed in the
literature.n
allow f(Jr a more limitt,d federal rolt,).
5. ,James 1~. Ryan. The Perverse lncentiues of the No Child Ll'ft /Jehind Al'f. 79
N.Y. U. L. l{c,v. 9:!2, 989 (2001).
G. s('(' MAL<"oLM M. FEI·:u:Y & EllWAiwiWBIN. FEillmAus~t: PouTI<'.\I.IJn:NTITY
& TIL\(;Ic COJ\11'1(()1\IISE 12-1:l (2008) (dd'ining f(.'deralism).
7. Hobert. A Schapiro, '!!;ward a Them:v of lntaactive Federalism, 91 low,\ L.
J{JW. 2•1:), 2-1G-17 (200:0) (discussing tlw traditional "dualist." theory of fl•<h•ralism).
' /d. at 256 (arguing that the "overall dualist. project of dividing state from federal
authority providc•s little• guidancl, .. wh<m appliPd t.o NCLB).
9. See i\.nn McColl, Tough Call: Is No Child IA•ft /Jehind Constitutional'. 8() !'Ill
DELTA KAPI'.-\:--J 60•1, ()0-1-0fi (2005) (questioning the constitutionality of NCLB, but
n•cognizing its roots in thl' congrl'ssional spending power).
10. Kamina i\.liya Pinder, Fedl'ml IJI'mand an l"ocal Choice: Safeg·uardin.~· the
Notion of Fl'dcralism in l~dumtion Law and Policy. :)g .J.L. & ElllJ('. 1. 27 (2010) ("[i\.jll
statl•s accl'pted NCLB funds dc'8pit.l' t.lw rl'luctnncP of sonw to do so.'}
11. Michaul Heise, Thl' l'olitiml l~conomy of !o'ducation l•hlemlisrn, 5() E~JOI~Y
L .•J. 12fi. 127 (200f)) (noting that while' t.hl'rt' had been Jpgal attacks on NCLB norw had
succl,eded). One court has now lwld NCLB inconsistent with thl' l't•quin,nwnt.s for thl·
Spending Claus<', but this opinion addresses only thl' "unfunded mandate•" port ion of
NCLB and has not yl't. hl'en adoptl•d by othl'l' courts. 8el' Sch. Dist. of l'ontiac v. Sl,c':v of'
U.S. l)pp't of Educ., 58,1 F.:ld 2fi:l. '277 (6th Cir. 2009) (lb·iding that the fl'dl'ral
government. could not. require' states to spend tfwir own morwy to achil'Vl' NCLB goals
lwcausl' if' the i\ct purportc•d to n'quire such action, t.hl' language was ambiguous. in
violation of the unambiguous rl'quireml'nt of Spending Clause jurisprudc•m·l').
12. Schapiro, supra note 7, at. 29:) (arguing "the dualist approach providc•s lit.tlP
guidancl' in assc'ssing the NCLB [whilt' a m•w thc·or·y ofJ [pjolyphony providl·s at il'ast a
framl'work for analysis").
I :l. See, e.g .. id. at. 28:l (encouraging an approach that gives CongrPss direct
management on fc'dc,ral-st.ale int.l,ract.ion, but not providing any specific
n'comml'ndations for changl'S Lo NCLB).
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This article argues that the traditional institutions for
addressing federalism concerns-legislative and judicial-are
inadequate in the education context. Instead, Congress, in
reauthorizing NCLB, should give greater responsibility to
administrative agencies, particularly the Department of
Education (DOE). Part II traces the history of judicial and
legislative control of federalism concerns. Parts III and IV
introduce NCLB and the DOE's role in its enforcement. Part V
addresses new proposals for its reauthorization. Part VI
highlights novel theories of federalism and applies them to
NCLB. Part VII argues that agencies must be further engaged
in balancing state and federal concerns regarding education
reform.

II. HISTORY OF FEDERALISM AND EDUCATION LAW
For the first one hundred years of U.S. history, Congress
had a limited but active role in education. For example, as
early as 1785, the federal government required that proceeds
from the sale of land in the Northwest Territories go to public
schools. 14 Congress likely operated with self-restraint due to
pervading views of strong states' rights. 15 As a result, the
Supreme Court did not strike down a single federal law as
violating the Commerce Clause or the Tenth Amendment. 16
Congress's role increased after the ending of the Civil War
in 1865. 17 The federal government required new Union states
to provide free public schools and established an early form of
the Department of Education, 18 though departmental powers
were limited mainly to collecting and publishing data on the
state of American education. 19 The Court responded by putting
limits on congressional power: by 1936 the Court had narrowed
the scope of Commerce Clause power and had used the Tenth
Amendment to prohibit even federal taxing and spending

11. Erik W. !{obelen, The /~valuing Federal Role, in LESSONS OF A CE:--JTURY: A
NATION'S SCHOOLS COME OF Acm 240 (2000).
15. See FOIWEST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN
lMPEWO, 1776-1876 (2000) (describing how many people believed that states could
nullify unconstitutional federal laws).
16. ERWIN CHEMEIUNSKY, l~NHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21''
CENTURY145~008).

17. See id. (describing how the Civil War ended defiance to federal power).
18. l{obelen, supra note 1111, at 210.
19. ld.at211.
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power from encroaching into traditionally state activities. 20
Despite the Court's restrictive views, however, Congress
enacted the 1917 Smith-Hughes Act, which succeeded in
providing federal aid to schools in the form of grants for
vocational programs. 21
From the late 1930s to the early 1990s, the Court's
opposition to congressional power decreased, clearing the way
for a greater federal role in education. The Court shifted to a
"nationalist" perspective, rejecting the Tenth Amendment as a
constraint on federal legislative power and permitting broad
legislation based on Congress's commerce and spending
powers. 22 The federal role in education indeed expanded:
Congress provided money for school construction and teacher
salaries, supported veterans going to college and local school
districts affected by military mobili1mtion, passed school lunch
programs, and provided aid for areas affected by federal
acquisition of property. 23 The Cold War further encouraged
federal support for math, science, and foreign language
education to stay competitive with Soviet rivals. 24
The federal aid, however, tended to favor wealthier school
districts to the detriment of poorer countryside and urban
schools. 25 To combat these disparities, Congress enacted
influential federal education legislation, including the 1965
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), the
precursor of NCLB. 26 ESEA dramatically increased federal
spending on K-12 education and helped the DOE gain
prominence in setting education policy-as the agency
administered ESEAY Congress also set the Secretary of
Education as a cabinet post. 2 x
At the same time, the states began creating statewide
education policies. 29 States have always provided, and continue
20. CHJ·:~n:I\JNt;KY, supra note 16, at 2fi9 n. :l ("Sec e.g .. Carter v. Carter Co;d Co ..
291-l U.S. 2:lil (1 9:l6) (limiting thL' commL,rce power): UnilL•d States v. ButlL•r. 297 U.S. 1
(1 \l:Hi) (invalidating spL,nding law for violating thL' TL•nth Anwndnwnt).").
21. ]{obelen. supra not.L' 11, at 210.
22. CHEI\IEHI'lSKY, supm notl' Hi. at Hfi.
2:l. Hoheil,n. su.pru note 11. at 210-11.
21. ld.
25. !d.
26. See /d. (listing the federal init.iativL's from thL' 19fi0s and 1970s).
27. ld.
2H. U.S. J)ep't of Educ .. Federal F!ole in l~ducation, ED.<:ov, http://l'd.gov/abouLI
ovL•rvit•wifL•dlrole.htmJ'isrc=ln (last modifipd Mar. :lO, 2011).
29. PAUl. :\1!\NNi\, SCIIOOL'S IN: FEIH:IL\LISI'vl ,\'ll> THI•: NXI'IOf\:;\1. EIHiCXI'ION
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to provide, the majority of the nation's education funding, but
typically did not have experts and political bodies dedicated to
education policy until the 1970s. 30 Since this time, state
governments have made strides towards providing equality of
financing amongst school districts, increasing educational
quality, and setting standards for student achievement. 31
The federal position shifted in 1981 when President Reagan
took office trumpeting the goal of a limited federal
government. 32 Although he managed to slow the increasing
level of federal spending on education, at least initially, he did
not otherwise decrease the federal role in education directly. 33
But he did limit the federal role in less-obvious ways. For
example, he required that executive agencies consider specific
federalism concerns when formulating policies 34 (an order
revoked by President Clinton 35 ) and, along with President
Bush, managed to appoint a Supreme Court majority of
conservatively-inclined justices. These conservative justices
have abated the increasing role of the federal government in
education, defending states' rights under the Tenth
Amendment36 and limiting the scope of the Commerce Clause
by prohibiting the federal government from regulating the
states in regards to "noncommercial" activities. 37 So as
Congress continues to increase the federal role in education,
the Supreme Court has essentially worked against that effort,
shifting back to a "federalist" perspective, increasingly focused
on states' rights.
Although states' rights advocates expected this "federalism
revolution" to affect Congress's spending power, the Court has
ACENJJA 10 (2006).
:lO. ld.
:n. Jd.at10-11.
:l2. See J{obelen, supra note 11, at 211 (describing President !{eagan's priority of
limiting the federal role in education).
:l:-l. Jd.
:H. Exec. Order No. 12612, 52 Fed. He g. 11685 (Oct. 26, 1987).
:l5. Exec. Order No. 1:-108:3, 68 Fed. Reg. 27651 (May 14, 1998), revoked by Exec.
Order No. 131 :l2 , 64 Fed. He g. 1:l255 (Aug. 1, 1999).
:16. CHEMEHINSKY, HUpra note 16, at 116.
:37. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting congressional
Commerce Clause authority to impose firearm regulation); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limiting congressional Commerce Clause authority to regulate
domestic violence); Schapiro, supra note 7, at 247 ("With regard to the key source of
federal authority, the Interstate Commerce Clause, the United States Supreme Court
has fastened on to the distinction between 'commercial' and 'noncommercial' activity as
a defensible boundary for an enclave of exclusive state control.").
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left this power largely unbridled. 3 x Even today, the Spending
Clause remains mostly unconstrained by federalism concerns 39
resulting in Congress pushing its education policy on states
primarily by conditioning federal funding on state adherence to
federal priorities. 4 For example, in 1994 Congress passed
President Clinton's Goals 2000: Educate America Act, which
focused on using federal aid to assist states in creating their
own academic achievement standards and assessment
mechanisms. 41 Congress included these types of reforms m
subsequent reauthorizations of ESEA, 42 including NCLB. 43

°

Ill. KEY PROVISIONS OF NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND
With NCLB, Congress sought to improve academic
achievement of all students~but particularly disadvantaged
students~through increased accountability of public-school
systems. 44 To this end, NCLB requires states, in order to
receive federal funds, to implement standards-based tests to
determine annual yearly progress, require teachers to meet
:JS. See Samuel 1{. BagPnstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the F!oherts Court, 5S
DUKE L .•J. :J-15 (2001\) (discussing how the ]{phnquist Court left tfw congrPssional
spending power largely untouched and pn,dicte:d the• Roberts Court ma.v still limit such
authority). l'mfi.•ssor Bagenstos notes: "Throughout thP J{ehnquist Court's 'fec!t•ralism
n•volution,' as tlw Court cut back on federal power unde'r Article• I and tlw Civil Wm·
AmendmPnts, many commentators nssprte:d that the sJwnding powpr was nc•xt to go on
tfll' chopping block. The: SJJl'nding power seemed to offer Congress a way to circumvent
the limitations the Court had imposed on the other le:gislative: powe•rs .... To deofl'nckrs
of states' rights, Llll' spending power now se:emed '[t]he: grl'atest threat to statl'
autonomy,' and was thus likcdy to be• Llw rwxt front in Llll' l'ede:ralism rl'volution .... In
tlw end. the He:hnquist Court nevpr got around to limiting Congrl'ss's powe•r unde•r tlw
Spc•nding Clause.'' !d. at :Hfi-·1S.
:m See id. at :J-19-50 ("'n its first two significant case•s addressing Llw scope• of
fedpral power---cases that ruled (narrowly) in favor of feckral abrogations of state•
sovc•reign immunity-the !{obe•rts Court see:nwd to follow the sanw nonrl'volutionary
line: as did the: late: lh:hnquist Court. Onl' might. thl'rdon•, expPet tlw !{ohl'rts Court
also to be charitable• about Congrc:ss's exercise of tlw spending powe•r.").
10. Not only is this thl' nwthod use•d for NCLB, but also fi>r thl' ne•we•r !{ace: to tlw
Top Program, which provides awards to state:s that dl've:lop Uw lll'st l'ducation plans
according to pre-established measuring standards. 8ec generully U.S. DI·:I''T 01·' ElllJ(' ..
RACE TO 'I'HI•: '1'01' I'IWW(M1: EXECUTIVI•: SUMMi\I{Y (Nov. 2009) [hc•reinaftpr ]{i\('1•: TO
'I'H 1·: T<ll' !'!{()(; IL\M], auailahlc at http://www2.c,d.gov/programs/racl'tothe:top/exc:cu tive•summary.pdf (summarizing tlw !{ace• to the Top program).
·11. Robl'len. supra note 1·1. at 211.
12. /d.
1:l. Sec Wayne C. !{iddlc' & Rl'bc:cca It Skinm•r, The /.;lcmentar.v and Secondary
r;dumtion Act, as Amended by the No Child /,eft /Jehind Act: A l'ri111er, in ;o.Jo CIIILil
LEFT BEHIND: lSSLII•:SANIJ DIWELOI'~H:NTS 1-\,1 (!'au] H. llerkhart e:d., 2001-1).
1·1. /d.
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specific qualifications, and shut down schools not meeting
annual benchmarks. 45 Funding is distributed using four
different formulas, all of which primarily consider state
expenditures on students and the number of students from
poor families. 46 NCLB also grants funding for specific
programs: drug-abuse prevention, impact aid, teacher
development, and instruction for limited English proficiency. 47
This part of the article examines NCLB's key features in more
detail.

A.

Standards-Based Assessments and AYP Determinations

According to President George W. Bush, annual testing
administered by states is the "cornerstone" of NCLB, allowing
state control and flexibility. 48 States annually test students in
grades 3 to 8 in mathematics and reading or language arts 49
and do so once more during grades 10 to 12. 50 States also test
students in science annually. 5 1 The results of these tests place
students in one of three categories: advanced, proficient, or
basic. 52 The states also must administer a national test-the
National Assessment of Educational Progress-to 4th and 8th
grade students. 53
States must use the results from these tests to determine
whether schools and school districts are making "adequate
yearly progress." 54 This determination is complex and
increasingly guided by the federal government, and this
requirement applies to all public schools, local educational
authorities, and the state overall. 55 In addition, states must try
to get all students testing at proficient or advanced levels by
2014. 56 The federal government allows a limited number of
states to use an experimental "growth" model for calculating
15. /d.
4G. ld. at 8fi.
17. ld. at 81.
18. MANNA, supra notP 29, at 119.
19. 20 U.S.C. § G:111(b)(:1)(C)(v)(l) (2011).
50. /d.
51. !d. at§ Klll (h)(il)(C)(v)(II).
52. !d. at§ G:lll(h)(2)(C).
5il. /d. at§ 6311 (c)(2).
51. !d. at§ G:lll (b)(2)(B).
55. PAUL H. BEltKHAI{'I', NO CHJLD LEFT BEHIND: iSSUES AND DEVELOPMENTS viii
(Paul H. Berkhart ed., 2008).
56. /d.
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yearly progress. 57
As the federal government discovered, pressing states
toward overall national progress presents unique challenges. It
was difficult to account for variations in fifty different schools
systems and student populations. 5 x Some states protested that
they would have to use their own resources 59 to implement the
requirements of NCLB since federal funds made up only about
7%> of the total education bill. 60 Additionally, it also proved a
challenge to seek academic improvement in the nation's
students as a whole while targeting disadvantaged and
minority students. 61 Tracking the progress of various groups
met this challenge theoretically, but federal officials had to
spend time fine-tuning the formula. 62 Federal officials also had
to balance enforcement of NCLB with the desire to have it
widely accepted by the states-to the point of issuing multiple
revisions and policy updates. 63 Now that all states have
accepted NCLB, the DOE has penalized multiple states for
failing to meet its requirements. 64

57. See l{idrlle & Skinner, supra note 1:l. at ~7 ("In n•cent yem·s. then• has been
increasing inturpst in using 'growth' models to dett,rmine 1\ Yl', by· which tlw
achievt•ment. of individual pupils is tracked from year to yt•ar."). Becausl' of the growing
populm·ity of this approach, "[u]nder a pilot program, a limited numbt•r of statt•s an•
hl'ing allowerl to use such models." /d.
5R M,\:-.JN,\, supra note 29. at 122.
59. !d. (describing the difficultit:s faced by thl' draftl:rs of NCLB).
(iO. /d. at 121, 1:l2 (discussing how NCLB puts high capacity dt•mands on states
and Virginia's pi'Otest to tht• "sweeping intrusion" of the fl,deral govl:rnml:nt that would
"ovc•rwhelm Virginia's flnances and throw tlw state from progn:ss it had aln•ady madl'
on incn•asing student achievl'ment.").
(il. !d. at 121.
62. See id. at 125 (dt,scribing how the original 1\ Yl' formula inal'l'llnttely lalll•bl
successful schools as failun•s ).
():l. /d. at J:l-1-:l:) (dl'scribing how !'resident Bush and tht: St•crdary of Education
praist•d statl:s and issul'd policy revisions wlwn states Wl'n' failing to nwd
requin:nwnts under thP Act, in ordt•r to maintain tlw ability to purstw t.lwir agc•nda).
(i•l. Sec .Janet Y. Thomas & Kevin 1'. Brady, The l~lementwy and Secondury
/~dum/ion Act at 10: l~quity, Accountability, and the l~volving f•(,dcml Role in l'ublic
}<;ducation. 29 ]{EV. HJ>:S. EIHH'i\'t'ION G1, (i 1 (2005) (dl'Sl'l'ihing situations whl•n• t lw
Department of Education has ptmalized statl's financially for failing to nwl't ;\JCLB
n•quirernents). In 200:). Professors .Janet Thomas and Kevin Brady n·counted th('
f(Jl!owing l'Xamples: ''Georgin had its funding reducl:d hy :ji7l~,:lOO for failing to align
its high school (pst with state content standards .
. That same year. M inrwsota's
administrative budget was cut hecausl: it. uspd attendancP n'cords ratlwr than tlw
n•quin·d tl':;t scores to report 1\ Yl' .... In 200G Texas lost almost half' a million dollars
in administrative support for failing to notify parents that tht•ir childn·n had thl' right
to transfer from failing schools .... Thl' District of Columbia is facing a 25",., decn'aSl'
in aid for failing to mateh standardizPd testing to acadl•mic JWrformnncl' standards."
/d. (internal citations omittl•d).
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Teacher Qualifications

States must require public school teachers to be "highly
qualified" in core subjects. 65 This means they must possess a
bachelor's degree, state certification or equivalent, a license to
teach, and demonstrate competence in the subject they teach. 66
Critics argued that this standard was overly stringent,
provoking the DOE to issue revisions and flexibility provisions
for groups like rural schools and multi-subject teachers. 67
Critics also continue to complain that the requirements do not
take actual student achievement into account. 68

C.

Shutting Down Schools Failing to Meet A YP

In addition to guidelines for student achievement and
teacher qualifications, NCLB mandates how states must
handle failing schools receiving federal funding. 69 If a school
does not make adequate progress for two consecutive years,
then that school's students must be given the option to attend a
school that is meeting NCLB standards. 70 If progress isn't
made after three consecutive years, the state must offer
supplemental educational services (from a parent-selected
provider "with a demonstrated record of effectiveness") to lowincome students at the schooP 1 After four consecutive years,
the school must take one or more "corrective actions" mandated
by statute. 72 A year after taking one of these corrective
65. 20 U.S.C. § 6:119(a)(1) (2006).
66. Riddle & Skinner, supra note 1a, at 87.
67. S!'!' MANNA, supra note 29, at 1 :H<l5 (describing pressures causing the
Department of Education to revise the teacher qualification standards); see also U.S.
Dep't of Educ., New No Child L!'(t Behind Flexibility: Hi!Jhly Qualified Teachers Fact
ED.(;ov
(Mar.
2001),
http://www2.cd.gov/nclb/mcthods/tcachers/
Sheet,
hqtflexibility.html (discussing flexibility in meeting "highly qualified" requirement).
68. S!'e Sam Dillon, Obama to Seek Sweepin!J Chan!Je in 'No Child' Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at Al [hereinafter Dillon Changes], available at
h ttp:l/www .n yti mes.com/20 10/02/01/ educa tion/0 1child. h tm]'/pagewanted=all
(describing criticisms and new proposals regarding teacher qualifications).
69. See 20 U.S.C. § 6:116(b) (2006); BERKHAI<T, supra note 55, at viii. Here,
"failing" means failure to meet AYP. Also, it should be noted that around 94% of all
local educational entities receivt; funds through NCLB. McColl, supra note 9, at 609.
70. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b) (2011).
71. /d. at§ 6:l16(b)(S)(B)(iii) & (e)(l).
72. !d. at § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iv). The options are as follows: "(i) l{cplace the school
staff who arc relevant to the failure to make adequate yearly progress. (ii) Institute
and fully implement a new curriculum, including providing appropriate professional
development for all relevant staff, that is based on scientifically based research and
offers substantial promise of improving educational achievement for low-achieving
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actions, 73 the school must implement a plan for "alternate
governance" that fits within one of five specified
arrangements. 74 Although even cr1t1cs agree that failing
schools must be identified and improved, 75 they challenge these
requirements as incomplete and overly restrictive. 76 They
argue that the requirements resulted more from political
compromise than from a fair assessment of the best way to
improve failing schools. 77

students and l'nabling the school to makp adt,quatP yearly progn'ss. (iii) Significantlv
decrease managL,ment authority at the school levPI. (iv) Appoint an outsidl· l'Xlll'rt to
advise the school on its progress toward making adequatP yt•arly progrPss
(v)
Extpnd the school year or school day f(>r the school. (vi) J{pstructurP tlw intl'rnal
organizational structure of the school." !d.
7:1. The local education agency can delay correctivl' actions for a year, bringing
the total time failing to meet i\ YP up to six ypars. Sec id. at~ 6:1Hi(h)(7)(D).
7·1. !d. at ~ ();)] G(h)(8)(B). The arrangemPnts include: "(i) f{porwning the school as
a public charter school. (ii) Replacing all or most of the school staff (which may includl'
tlw principal) who an' reJL,vant to the failure to makP adequate yt'arly progrPss. (iii)
Entering into a contract with an entity, sueh as a private management company. with
a <kmonstrated record of dlectivl"wss, to operate tlw public school. (iv) Turning thl'
operation of t.hl' school over to the St.atl' educational agPncy. if rwnnittPd unrll't' StatP
law and agrPPd to by the State. (v) i\ny othPr major t·pstructuring of the school's
govurnanep arrangetnent that n1akes fundan1ental refonns, such as signifi('ant changPs
in the school's staffing and governance. to improve studL•nt. academic achiPvPmPnt in
thP school and that has substantial pr-omisl' of enabling thl' school to makP adPquate
yearly progress ... ."!d.
7G. See Editorial, Lesson for Failing Schools, N.Y. TII\1\<:S, ,July 6, 2009, at A1H,
available at http://www.nytimt•s.com/2009/07/()()/opinion/()()monl.html (supporting
Sucrdary of Education i\rne Duncan's comnwnts that statl" should t.akl' bold action on
failing schools).
7(). Sec !{0:-.J,\Lil C. BIV\IlY, THOIVI.\S B. FOIWH.\M FOlJN!li\TION. C.\N F.\11.1:-.JC
SCIHJOLS
Ill<:
FIX!m'!
:l0-:l:1
(.Jan.
200:1).
cwailuh/e
ut
http://www.l'ric.Pd.gov/I'IWSII~D19H798.pdf (arguing that no orw inll•rvention stratcg,·
yil~lds a succl'SS rate of greatm· than 50%. and that policymakPrs should considt'r
additional options f(,r improving education ... ); Claudia Sanclwz, State Stmg~;lc W1:til
Next
Step
for
Failing
Schools,
:-.JI'I{
(FPb.
22,
2006),
uuailahle
ut
http://www.npr.org/tpmplatcs/story/story.php'1storyld=522HG:l0 (highlighting thl' fact
that NCLB does not address what should happen wlwn a school fails for the sixth
consecutive year in a row); Elissa Coolman, N•wcr City Students Seclc Trcwsj(•rs /o
!Jetter
Schools,
N.Y.
T!MJ<:S,
Oct.
Hi.
20(J1,
at
ll:l.
cwuilable
at
http://www.nytimPs.com/20(H/1 0/15/t,ducat.ion/1 Gschool.ht.ml (noting prob!Pms with
implenwnting thl' NCLB provisions regarding school transf(•r).
77. Sec Lizettu i\lvan•z, Senators Are Nearing Compromisc on Rescuing Failing
Schools,
N.Y.
TIIVH:s.
i\pr.
S.
2001,
at
SPc.
1,
2:l.
cwailablc
ut
http://www .nyti nH •s.com/200 1/01108/ us/ sen a tors-an~-1wa ring-com prom iSl' -on- n·scu in gfailing-schools.html (implying that !{epublican vil,WS on vouchers may have• int1m·nced
school choice provisions): Lizdtl' Alvan,z, Senate !'asses /Jill for Ann uul 'f(,sts in l'ublic
Schools,
N.Y.
TIMES,
,Jmw
1 G.
2001.
at
i\ 1.
auailahle
at
h t. tp :1/www. nyti m es.com/200 1/()()/ 15/u s/ Sl' na tl'- passes- b iII- for-ann ua I- tests-in-pub Iicschools.htmJ'>pagewantpd=all&src=pm
(discussing
how
both
DL•mocrats
and
!{ppublicans bad to compromise isstws in order to pass thP S(•nate version of NCLB).
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IV. ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Although NCLB expanded the DOE's position as a national
standard setter, early setbacks caused Congress to limit DOE
enforcement. 78 Prior to NCLB, the DOE dispersed federal
funds, offered assistance, and attempted to encourage state
compliance, but the agency did not impose negative
consequences on states for not complying with achievement
standards. 79 The DOE now monitors and enforces progress
requirements, teacher qualification, and failing-school
consequences. 80 Additionally, Congress gave the DOE an
integral position in facilitating federalism by giving it the
power to grant waivers to states. 81 Meant to encourage states
to try new methods of achievement, 82 states mainly sought
waivers when unable to meet yearly progress requirements. 83
This has led to allegations that waivers dilute accountability
standards. 84
Initial enforcement by the DOE proved a bumpy road. For
example, although President Bush and Congress instructed the
DOE to strictly enforce the Reading First program, allegations
soon arose that the agency, by influencing school reading
curriculum, had violated a federal law 85 that prohibits it from
supervising or controlling local curriculum. 86 This provision
puts the DOE in a tough spot: entrusted with enforcing federal
policy in local schools but prohibited from influencing their
78. Pinder, supra note 10, at 29.
79. See id. at 1 ~3 (discussing the pre-NCLB DOE).
80. Jd. at 15 (discussing the effect of NCLB on DOE).
81. 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (2011).
82. See Kristina 1'. Doan, No Child Left Behind Waivers: A Lesson in Federal
Flexibility or Regulatory Failure?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 211, 216-18 (2008) (discussing the
momentum leading to the decision to allow NCLB waivers).
8:3. See Garda, supra note 1, at 70 (discussing how states have used waivers to
dilute their A YP requirements).
84. See, e.g., Pinder, supra note 10, at 85 ("many states have used loopholes and
waivers to dilute the impact of NCLB's accountability provisions.").
85. ld. at 16 (citing OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE
READING FIRST PROGRAM'S GRANT APPLICATION PROCESS 6-26 (2006)).
86. 20 U.S.C. § 340:3(b) (2011). The full provision states that: "No provision of a
program administered by the Secretary or by any other officer of the Department shall
be construed to authorize the Secretary or any such officer to exercise any direction,
supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or
personnel of any educational institution, school, or school system, over any accrediting
agency or association, or over the selection or content of library resources, textbooks, or
other instructional materials by any educational institution or school system, except to
the extent authorized by law." Jd.
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curriculum. K7 The backlash from the Reading First program
undermined one of the keys for NCLB's success-strict state
accountability-contributing to NCLB's failure to live up to its
promise of improving academic achievement.K~

V. THE

0BAMA ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED CHANGES TO

NCLB
The Obama administration has proposed wide-ranging
changes to NCLB.~ 9 These changes include increasing state
competition for federal funds, eliminating the 2014 deadline for
student proficiency, and replacing the current progress
requirements with a new goal of creating "college-and careerready" students. 90 The proposal preserves the analysis of
demographic groupsY 1 Schools showing improvement would he
rewarded. 92 The National Governors Association is already
coordinating an effort, joined by over 40 states, to write
common standards to define "college- and career-ready." 93
The proposed changes seek to respond to key objections
from educators. Instead of focusing solely on funding districts
based on their proportion of poor students, the administration
wants to reward academic progress. 94 Instead of schools
claiming entitlement to funds, it will give funds to schools that

87. See Pindur, supra note 10, at ](j ("Thl' rPport and its political afternwth ll'ft
thl' Department with conflicting messages of how to mel't its obligation to Pnforcl' the
pn•scriptive curricular requin•nwnts of scientifically-basl"l res('arch within the
parameters of the statutory prohibitions against the h•deral govprnnwnt from
influencing or din~cting statl' and local curricula.").
1-\8. Professor Pinder suggests: TI'Jiw backlash against fpderal pnforcenwnt of
NCLB's accountability measurPs has been so strong that Congn~ss responded h:-·
restricting the Depat·tmunt of Education's ability to d'f('ctively Pnf(,rct' the rigorous
requirements of NCLB. This expandPd fedt•ral role not only failed to bring about
discernible successful academic rPsults, it weak('ned tlw very qualities that held much
of NCLB's potential for success." /d. at 29.
89. See f)i/lon Changes. supra note 61-\ (describing the proposed changes. as
described in a policy docum('nt discussing the 2011 Department of Education budgd).
90. St'c U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., i\ BLUEI'J{JN'I' Fcm IWFOJ(M: THE i{J·:.\UTHOJ<IZATIOt--:
OF THE ELEME:'>JT!\J{Y ANJJ SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT :l (Mar. 201 0) jhen~inafter
BJ.UJ·:J'RINTj, available at http://www2.ed.gov/policy/(,lseciiPgiblueprint/blueprint.pdf
(discussing the goal of '"college and carPer n~ady").
91. See Oillon Changes, supra note ()8 (summarizing Obama's proposal for NCLB
reauthorization).
92. BLUJ•:I'J{JN'I', supra noU' 90. at. 9 (discussing the goal of '"college and carepr
ready'}
9:l. Dillon Changt's, supra note 68.
91. BLLH:I'JUNT. supra note 90, at. 9.
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promise greater reform, similar to the Race to the Top
Program, which is viewed as a success. 95 Instead of branding
schools as failing, 96 the administration hopes it can approach
accountability in a more nuanced way, differentiating between
good schools that are dealing effectively with low-scoring
students and schools with high-performing students that may
be neglecting low-scoring students. 97 The administration is
avoiding talk of merit pay, which helped derail the attempted
2007 rewrite of NCLB, but the new effort may use student
achievement as a benchmark for teacher qualification. 98 A
Senate panel recently approved a bill that adopts the general
contours of this approach. 99
VI. APPLYING THEORIES OF FEDERALISM TO NCLB
Under a conventional viewpoint of federalism, NCLB is a
federal encroachment into a traditionally state realm. 100 But
the federal role in education shows no signs of decreasing, so
new theories are needed to explain and analyze this unique
federal and state collaboration. 101
95. !d. at :l6 (discussing how the new proposal is modeled after Race to the Top).
See RN:E TO THE TOP PROGRAM, supra note 10.
96. See Arne Duncan, Reauthorization of ESEA: Why We Can't Wait, Remarks at
the
Monthly
Stakeholders
Meeting
(Sept.
21,
2009),
available
at
http://www2.ed.gov/news/speeches/2009/09/09242009.html ("' also agree with some
NCLB critics: the law was underfunded-it unfairly labeled many schools as failures
even when thc'Y were making progress-it places too much emphasis on raw test scores
rather than student growth-and it is ovc,rly prescriptive in some ways while it is too
blunt an instrument of ref(Jrm in others.").
97. See /Jillon Chanf{es, supra note 68 (discussing the administration's hopes for a
new accountability standard).
98. BLUEPRINT, supra note 90, at 1 ("We arc calling on states and districts to
develop and implement systems of teacher and principal evaluation and support, and
to identify effective and highly effective teachers and principals on the basis of student
growth and other factors."); Dillon Chanues, supra note 68 (discussing the opposition to
merit pay).
99. See News From THE SENATE HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSION
COMMITTEE, l~LEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION REAUTHORIZATION ACT:
SUMMARY
OF
PROGRAMS
(2011),
available
at
http://harkin.senate.gov/
documents/pdf/1e9151 f1921d:1.pdf.
100. See Donald C. Orlich, No Child /,eft Behind: An Illogical Accountability
Model, 78 CLEARING HOUSE 6, 7 (2004) ("This new federalism lexperienced through
NCLBJ encroaches on states' rights, as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment.").
101. See Schapiro, supra note 7, at 256 n.48 and accompanying text (discussing
how the arguments that NCLB "are quite weak and serve to emphasize how the
current doctrines of dualist federalism do not provide a useful vocabulary for discussing
real contemporary issues of federalism."); Gail L. Sunderman, The Federal Role in
Education: From the Reagan to the Obama Administration, 21 VOICES U!W. Euuc. 6,
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NCLB could just be a sign that federalism is obsolete in
America. This contention has been made by Professors Malcolm
Feeley and Edward Rubin, who suggest that federalism is
merely a tool for political compromise. 102 According to them,
America now has a strong national identity and the states do
not hold strong distinct values, so federalism is no longer
necessary. 103 Although they recognize federalism won't
disappear any time soon, 104 Feeley and Rubin suggest that
education is an area where national standards may be
particularly appropriate, as highlighted by the recent initiative
of the National Governors Association to establish uniform
national education standards. 105 Feeley and Rubin point out
that people promoting "state rights" often use federalism
arguments to obscure their true objectives-whether they arc
preserving parental control, promoting school experimentation,
or avoiding federal bureaucracy-when it would be better to
debate these underlying policies directly. 10 h
Instead of arguing federalism is obsolete, Professor Erwin
Chemerinsky argues for an augmented theory of federalism as
empowerment. 107 He contends that the genius of federalism is
giving multiple actors power to address society's ills. 10 s He
suggests that federal and state governments should vigorously
and simultaneously try to reform education, with little

J:l (200!1) ("By all indications. the Obama administration will continup <·xpanding thl'
federal role in education.").
102. FI•:I·:LI•:Y & l{lll\1:-.1. supra note (). at 1 :)2-fi:l (summarizing tlw author's view or
f<•deralism and how it is "wstigial in the U nit.ed StaL<•s'}
1O:l. /d. at 152. l'roressors F'"'"'Y and !{ubin not<' that: "The situation now is that
th<• United States has a highly integrated culturl'. and most or its citiz<•ns id<•ntif\
strongly as Americans. !{<•gional diffpn•ncl'S l'xist and arl' occasionally cl'kbrated, but
they are trivial in comparison with tlw divisions that exist in other nations. As a restdt.
federalism is vestigial in the United StaLl'S. It is a histOl'ical nwmory that no long<•r
serves any political purposl', and it is thus available for manipulation by forcl's that
opposl' each otlwr with resJwct to issm•s that, unlike fl'd<·ralism itsdf. JWopk rl'ally
can: about." !d.
101. !d. at H!cl, 152-G:l.
lOG. See David .J. Hoff. National Standards Gain 8tewn: Goucrnors' Support
Hooted in Concerns oucr Competition, EIHICATION Mxrn;m-; (S<•pt. 200!1), auuilable at
http://www .aaet<•ach<:rs.org/m:wsldtersisl'ptrwwsO!cl. pdf (discussing
t lw
N a tiona I
Governors Association emlrt to cn·at<· national standards).
106. See FI•;ELI-:Y & IWBI:-.1, supru note G. at I Hi-17 (discussing how f(•deralism is
ust:d as a political tool rath"r than for its merits).
107. See CHEMI·:I{JNSKY, supra note Hi. at 2,1()-,17 (arguing that the Court should
em brae<: a m·w theory of federalism).
101·\. /d. at. 11()-,17.
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restraint from courts. 109 He also argues that, to empower
states, the preemption doctrine should be applied only in
circumstances where the federal government expressly
preempts state law. 110 Although this theory appears to be
broader than the Supreme Court's current stance on federal
power, it is less radical than the theory that federalism is
obsolete altogether. 111
Similar to Chemerinsky, Professor Robert Schapiro argues
for a "polyphonic" approach to federalism. 112 Since the federal
and state governments cannot take away each other's authority
to create law, these governments "represent independent voices
of authority." 113 Schapiro describes this interaction as
"polyphony"-when both federal and state governments can
voice their independent ideas and concerns on education law
and policy. 114 He criticizes Chemerinsky's theory for having
"nothing to say about the No Child Left Behind Act, other than
that courts should keep their hands off it." 115 In contrast,
polyphonic federalism, he argues, provides "at least a
framework" for analyzing NCLB. 116 As a "joint state-federal
effort to improve education," 117 he says, NCLB fosters more
accountability of education policy set solely by states. 118
Schapiro acknowledges, however, that his "analysis rests to
109. Jd.
110. ld. at 158.
111. ld. at 21G.
112. 8ce I{OBJ<:R'I' A
SCHJ\I'II((), l'OLYI'HONIC' FEDEHALISM: TOWARD Tim
PI\O'I'ECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2009) (proposing this new theory of
federalism).
11:l. Schapiro, supra note 7, at 218-19.
111. Professor Schapiro describes the concept of polyphony, by discussing the
following: "[I'Jolyphony ... emphasizes multiplicity. Polyphony entails many voices ....
'It may be useful to draw an analogy between the development of law, so conceived, and
the development of music. From the eleventh and twelfth centuries on, monophonic
music, reflected chiefly in thl' Gregorian chant, was gradually supplanted by
polyphonic styles.' [Professor Harold Berman] not[es] the significance of plurality in
Western legal culture. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty has similarly found polyphony to be a
useful concept for evoking political pluralism. Polyphony thus highlights the key
features of federalism. It shifts the focus away from dualism's concern with protecting
state or federal turf. Instead, federalism is about the interaction of multiple
independent voices. These characteristics allow a polyphonic conception to avoid the
trap of dualism, while still reaping the benefits of federalism." ld. at 95 (quoting
HAHOL!l ,J. BERMAN, LAW /\Nil REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTEHN LEGAL
'l'RAiliTION 7 (198a)).
115. !d. at 90.
116. ld. at 10:3.
117. Jd.
118. !d.
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some extent on an optimistic account of NCLB," 119 and he
never recommends how NCLB should change when
reauthorized. The changes he does propose~limiting
preemption doctrine and using our dual court system to protect
fundamental rights 120 ~would have little effect on NCLB
because of the liberal judicial approach to the Spending Clause
and the lack of a federal right to education. 121
Finally, NCLB could be viewed through the lens of
Professor Gillian Metzger's work. She argues that, because the
administrative state necessarily intersects with federalism
concerns, administrative law is useful to states and courts in
addressing these concerns. 122 For example, states have used
traditional agency procedures to challenge the rationality of
agency decisionmaking. 123 And the Supreme Court has used
administrative law to address federalism by applying unique
standing rules and heightened substantive scrutiny when
analyzing agency action challenged by states. 124 Metzger
argues that agencies are particularly responsive to states
because regional offices give agencies a closer connection to
states and state implementation ensures that agencies account
for their interests. 125 Additionally, agencies safeguard state
interests because their rulemaking guidelines require review of
state input in a way that ad hoc litigation does not; agencies
are subject to judicial review; and agencies can review state
concerns on an ongoing basis. 126 As discussed in the next
section, Metzger's proposal holds promise in increasing the
"polyphony" of NCLB because administrative law might
provide the perfect stage for state and federal government to
raise their voices on education policy.

!d. at 101.
Schapiro. supra notP 7. at ~91-9ti.
1 ~1. Federal law doe~ not recognizP a ft><h,.·al right. to Pducation. See San Antonio
lndPp. Sch. Dist. v. l{odriguez, "111 U.S. 1 (197:l) (dPnying a pdition to n•cognize a
federal right. to education).
1~~. Gillian E. Metzger. 1\dministmtiue /,uw as the New !•hlem/ism, G7 DUKE L .•J.
119.

1~0.

202:1

(~OOH).

1~:1.
1~"1.

!d.
!d.
12i'i. !d.
12G. /d.

at ~05G-fi0.
at. 20():1-65.

at

~071-7i'i.

at

~077 -()~.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NCLB REAUTHOIUZATION
The theories above support one argument: the federal
government should continue to take a role in education, but the
traditional mechanism for accountability-the courts and
detailed
congressional
legislation-are
inadequate
in
addressing the federalism concerns raised by education reform.
The courts currently do not put meaningful constraints on
NCLB, 127 and proposals to modify this approach are
unworkable 12 x and would decrease polyphony by unnecessarily
cabining federal involvement. 129 Protecting federalism concerns
in education reform requires a nuanced approach. When
Congress updates NCLB, it should establish mechanisms for
ongoing reform by granting greater authority to the
Department of Education, rather than by setting out detailed
new policies.
A.

Shortcomings of the Current Approach

First, a word on the shortcomings of the current approach,
which is both too monophonically federal and too hard to adjust
as new educational approaches are developed. Although states

127. See Schapiro. supra note 7, at 256 n.48 (discussing how the arguments that
NCLB is unmnstitutional "under the lenilmt standards ... [of] South Dakota v. Dole,
18:i U.S. 20:l (1987)" are "quite weak") (citing TASK FORCE ON No CH!Lil LEFT B~:H!Nil,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LECiiSLATUIU:S, FINAL REPORT 7 (2005) (alleging
NCLB is unconstitutional)); Heise, supra note 11, at 1:l5<l6 ("The traditional
mechanism for the rPsolution of such policy turf disputes [hetween local, state, and
federal interests in education policyJ-judicial enforcpment of federalism boundariesis noticeably absent where the federal government seeks to influence policy through
Congress's conditional spending authority .... ").
128. Sec .Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Conditions:
Federalism and Individual ilif{hts, 1 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 160, 161 (1995) ("The
Court has bePn hesitant to impose marked limits on the Congressional spending power
because it has adopted the Hamiltonian view that the spending power is an
independent power."). Likewise, Professor Heise notes that NCLB will likely not be
Sl,en as coercive because "[cjourts have permitted conditional spending programs where
the federal funding at issue is so large that a state had 'no choice' but to submit to
fL,deral policy. In contrast, the burden of the condition imposed by NCLB pales by
comparison. To be sure, $12.7 billion is a lot of money and, not surprisingly, Title I
funding is important to all states and most school districts. But state and local-not
federal-agencies shoulder the overwhelming bulk of the school finance load." Heise,
supra note 11, at 1:l8.
129. See Anthony Consiglio, Nervous Lauuhter and the High Cost of Equality:
Rcnewinf{ "No Child Left Behind" Will Safef{uard a Vibrant Federalism and a Path
Toward l~du.cational Excellence, 2009 BYU EDUC. & L.J. ::165, :169 (arguing that
proposals to invalidate federal involvement in education policies fail because they do
not point the way forward, but rely on the same mechanisms that did not work before).
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set the standards for measuring yearly progress, Congress
explicitly set the consequences for failing to meet those
standards. 130 This setup produces an incentive for states to
lower their standards to avoid failure. 131 Purely federal
standards have been suggested, 132 hut NCLB is already a
"monstrously complex statute."'-'-' Setting uniform standards
by statute hinders state experimentation and further
complicates the law. The federal government must find a way
to account for diverse state initiatives and allow states to have
their voices heard in setting national education policy.
Especially when using the spending power, the primary
restraint on federal involvement is the political process. 134
Some scholars suggest the political process sufficiently protects
federalism concerns, but this theory doesn't work in practice;
Congress did not give meaningful thought to state interests in
adopting NCLB. m Republicans wanted to support President
Bush in his first major domestic policy initiative, 136 and with
the parties aligned, lobbyists for state interests were
"intentionally frozen out." 137 The political process, then.
safeguards polyphony only when it will reap political
rewards. 1 -'~
NCLB is also unresponsive to ongoing state concerns. One
of the only ways for states to challenge federal education
policies is to sue the DOE for misapplying NCLB. 139 The City of
Pontiac in fact succeeded in convincing the Sixth Circuit that
See supra !'art 11./\-C (discussing th<' specifics of NCLB).
1:n. i{yan, supm noll- G. at 9i-IK-H9.
1:t1. !d. at 91-17-HH (arguing that if states cannot be trusted, tlwn tlw fe<kral
governnwnt should set standards).
1:l:l. /Jill on /lard /{unite. supra not<· 2 (quoting Ch<·st<•r K Finn, .Jr .. an assistant
se<Tdary ofl'ducation in the !{eagan administration).
1:l•1. The Note, No Child /,eft fichind und the l'ohlical Suji•guurds of Fedcrulism.
119 HAI\V. L. I{EV. i-\:-1:). :-191 (200fi) ("i\s a n•sult of the Suprenw Court's d<•cision in
South Dakota v. Doll', political safeguards are particularly important for federal
sp<•ruling legislation.").
1:l5. See id. at :-190, H9:l (discussing Professor lh•rlwrt Wc•chsler's argunwnt that
the political proc<•ss guanl<•d fl'd<•ralism, but noting that acting fech,ral legislators
seemed "indifferent" to federalism concerns during the n·authorization that produced
NCLB).
1:lG. !d. at l:l9:J.
1:l7. !d.
1:m. !d. at 902 ("Although the federal govt•mmPnt may not always act to
aggrandize pow<'r from tlw stat<•s. it will do so when the intrusion will n•ap political
capital.").
1 :m. Sec /Jill on Hard New rite, supra not<• 2 ("Spveral stall's supd tlw Bush
administration over the law in the last deeadP. 1msuccc•ssfully.").
1:lO.
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NCLB was unconstitutionally ambiguous. 140 But state lawsuits
are not usually so successful. For example, Arizona attempted
to challenge the DOE's decisions regarding students with
limited English proficiency, but the case was dismissed for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. 141 Similarly, when Connecticut
sued the Secretary of Education-alleging that the Secretary
violated the Administrative Procedures Act by rejecting the
state's amendments to its educational plan 142-a district court
upheld the Secretary's actions as not arbitrary and
capricious. 143
Scholars perennially forecast that reauthorization of NCLB
will finally vindicate state protests, 144 but legislation is simply
a poor mechanism for an issue-like education-that needs
periodic updating to reflect new research on improving
educational achievement. Recently, prominent NCLB advocate,
and former Assistant Secretary of Education, Diane Ravitch,
turned heads by reversing course on most of NCLB's core
principles. 145 She has become particularly opposed to using
competition to improve schools and standardized testing 146core components of NCLB that the current administration has
proposed retaining and even increasing. 147 She cites studies
concluding that NCLB is not increasing student achievement
and criticizes the approach of "measuring and punishing" as
prompting excess cheating by local districts. 14x She also notes

110. S!'!' Sch. Dist. Pontiac v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Educ., 581 F.ad 25:1, 277 (6th
Cir. 2009) ("lAJ state official deciding to participate in NCLB reasonably could read §
7907(a) to mean that the State need not comply with requiremPnts that are 'not paid
for under the Act' with federal funds.").
111. See Ariz. State Dep't of Educ. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 2007 WL 1:3:3581 (D. Ariz.
2007) (dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
112. Connecticut v. Spellings, 519 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Conn. 200H).
11:3. See id. at Jill.
111. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The 2006' Winthrop and Frances Lane Lecture: The
Unintended Lef{al and l'olicy Consequences of the No Child Left Behind Act, 86 NEB. L.
REV. 119, 12:3-25 (2007) (discussing how state lawsuits had not been effective but
noting that political prospectives in 2007 looked promising). Professor Heise noted that
while "lawsuits [challenging NCLB] have not been especially effective. On the political
front, however, the prospects for influencing NCLB appear more promising. That
NCLB is due for reauthorization in 2007 highlights the potential for change." !d.
115. Sec Sam Dillon, Scholar's School Reform U-Turn Shahes Up Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. :l, 2010, at A 1 :l [hereinafter Dillon U-Turnj, auailable at
http;//www. nytim es.com/20 1 0/0:l/O:ll ed uca tion/O:lravitch. h tml?pagewan ted"'a II
(describing Diane i{<lVitch's renunciation of many of the policies she once' promoted).
116. /d.
117. Dillon Chanf{cs, supra note 68.
11H. Steve Inskeep, Former 'No Child Left Behind' Aduocate Turns Critic, NPR
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that many states have lowered their standards to ensure
compliance with federal guidelines. 149
The studies Ravitch cites, however, date back to 2006. More
than four years have passed and a failing law has not been
changed. 150 The reason is simple: NCLB is politically charged
and the bipartisan support that existed for the 2001
reauthorization has disappeared. 151 Congress is increasingly
hostile to bipartisan efforts, to the detriment of a school system
in need of reform. By contrast, greater delegation to
independent agencies could create a more-f1exible regime. So in
reauthorizing NCLB, Congress should permit the DOE, in
coordination with the states, to set core guidelines for teacher
qualification, consequences for inadequate schools, and the
standard for measuring progress.
B.

The Promise of Administrative

T~aw

for Improving NCLB

Instead of merely renaming the existing standards and
making minor changes to teacher qualifications and
consequences for failing to meet NCLB's requirements, 152
Congress should simply set the broader objectives of national
education policy and let one or more administrative agencies
fill in the rest of the details. 153 As an example, Congress could
set the broad objective of "having qualified teachers," and allow
an independent federal agency, in consultation with states, to
set any further details of this objective. This approach not only
allows for ongoing state participation in modifying the NCLB
scheme, but it also promotes greater state participation in
creating the specific policies that compnse
NCLB
reauthorization itself.
(Mar.
1-1
2010),
!Wailahle
at
http://www. npr.org/ll•mplnt es/transcri pt/
transcript .php'lstoryld=1212091 00.
1 HJ. /d.
150. /d.
1 :) 1. /hi/on Hard llczorite. supra nott• 2 ("In 2001. wlwn Congn•ss compll'tt•d tlw
law's most n·cpnt. n•writl'. the dfor·t took a full Yl'ar, and tfw bipartisan const·nsus that
made that possible has long sincl' shattered.").
152. See supra Part ll.IJ and tH'compnn,·ing ll'xt.
15:l. The Sl'lTetary of Education has gl'IWI'nllv advocatl·d a similar app1·oach of
congn•ssionally-set brond standards. with loose definitions of whnt nwt'ls thost•
standards. Sec Anw Duncan, lh•authoriz<Ition of I•:SEA Whv Wl' Can't Wait.. i{l'markH
at
the
Monthly St.ak<d1olders Ml•Pting (Sept.
21,
20mJ).
rwailahle at
http://www2.l'd.gov/rwws/s]wechl•s/2009/09/092·12009.ht.ml ("[W]<' should hl· tight on thL•
goals-with clcilr standards sd by statr>s that truly prepan: young pl'oplt• l(n· collegL'
and can•t•rs-but Wl' should be loose on tlw Inl'ans for nwl'ling those goals").
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Such a task could fall to the DOE; the Secretary of
Education is already working on drafting new proposals for
reauthorization of NCLB. 154 Moreover, the DOE already
administers NCLB-issuing policy guidance and disciplining
states for noncompliance. 155 Scholars suggest that NCLB would
improve if the DOE simply offered more policy guidance. 156
Congress should go a step further, wiping the slate clean and
instructing
the
DOE-in
coordination
with
state
governments-to create the specific guidelines for achieving
broad educational goals through informal rulemaking. 157 This
approach would not necessarily require modifying the
prohibition against the DOE setting curriculum, since the
DOE-as Congress did with NCLB-could set only assessment
criteria and allow states to set the actual content of school
curriculum. 15 x
One of the primary weaknesses of this approach is that it
relies on Congress limiting its own role m setting the
151. Sec Dillon C:han{;es, supra note 68 ("lThe Secretary of Education] has been
working behind the scenes on rewriting the No Child law with a bipartisan h'TOUp of
senior lawmakers in both chambers"); Sam Dillon, No-Child Law is a Highlight of
Hearin{I on l~dumtion, N.Y. TIMEH, Mar. 1, 2010, at i\20 [hereinafter Dillon Hcarin{I],
available at http://www .nytimes.com/20 1O/O:l/01/education/01educ.h tml (describing
how Congress questioned the Secretary of Education on the prospects of
reauthorization).
155. MANNA, supra note 29, at 1 :l1-:i5 (describing how !'resident Bush and the
Secretary of Education praised states and issued policy revisions when states wen'
failing to meet requirements under the Act, in order to maintain the ability to pursue
thl,ir agenda); Thomas & Brady, supra notl' 61, at 61 (describing situations where the
Department of l~ducation has penalized states financially for failing to meet NCLB
n'quin•ments).
156. See Pinder, supra note 10, at 17 ("Many states do not have the capacity to
implement the supplemental services requirements for schools identified as 'failing,'
the highly qualified teacher provisions or thl' standards and assessments required
under the Adequate Yearly l'rogn,ss (i\Yl') provision; moreover, there is a dearth of
receiving schools to which students may transfer if their current school fails to meet
i\ Yl' standards, and {Iuidancc (rom the Department is insufficient." (emphasis added)).
157. The n'quin,ml,nts for informal rulcmaking arc described in the AI'A. 5 U.S.C.
§ 55:l (196G). Basic requirements include publishing "general notice of proposed rule
making ... in the Federal l{egister." /d. at ~ 55:l(b). Additionally, "after notice ... the
agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity
for oral presentation." /d. at ~ 55:3(c). Then, the agency must consider the "relevant
matter presented" and "incorporate in the rull's adopted a concise general statement of
their basis and purpose." /d. The final rule is published at least 30 days before its
effective date and an "interested person" has "the right to petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule." /d. at~ 55:3(d)-(e). Of course, Congress is free to tailor
these requirements in regard to any particular statutory scheme.
158. See Pinder, supra note 10, at 15-lG (discussing the limitations of DOE's
enabling act).
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particulars of education policy. But there are persuasive
reasons that Congress should consider doing so. Since an
agency will set the details of new policies, there is less
potential for the partisan gridlock that derided past
reauthorization efl'orts. 159 For Republicans, and even the Tea
Party, states' rights are a key concern, and this approach
encourages greater state participation in setting education
policy. For Democrats, this approach ensures that the federal
government will have a key role in setting objectives for
education policy. Perhaps most importantly, for both parties,
this approach sets the stage for the future success of federal
and state relations regarding education policy. By moving the
ongoing debate about education policy to a more responsive and
flexible body, members of Congress can assure constituents
that strides are being made in education policy, without having
to shoulder the criticisms of again making multiple missteps
due to political compromise.
This proposal also might be challenged as unconstitutional.
States could argue that, if they are forced to accept federal
funds before they know the specific rules the DOE will
eventually promulgate, the rule is too ambiguous. 1(' 0 Indeed,
courts have been conflicted over whether to permit agencies to
fi1l in the details of federal spending-clause legislation, though
mainly when an agency issues guidance with a congressional
mandate. 161 Congress could require that new DOE regulations
remain nonbinding until the next installment of federal funds,
allowing states to accept unambiguous terms when accepting
funds. 162 Congress also could preempt these arguments by
unambiguously notifying states that the DOE is entrusted with
159. See /)ilion Hard Ucwrite, supnt note• ~ (di'C:ll~~ing th<' partisan gridlock that
stopped p1·ior d'forts at reauthorization).
](iO. South Dakota v. llole. 1H:l U.S. 20:l, 207 (1 ~JH7) ("IWie hav(' requin•d that if
Congr<'ss desin•s to condition tlw States' re<·<•ipt of f<·<kral fllnds, it. 'mll~t do so
unambiguous!~- ... , <:nabl[ingj tlw Statc·s to <'Xt:rcisc: tlwir choi<'<' knowingly-, cogniwnt
of the cons.,quPnces of tlwir participation."' (quoting l'<:nnhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v.
Hald<•rrmm, •15 1 U.S. 1. 17 and n. J:l (1 ~JH 1)).
Hi1. David F. Engstrom, /Jmwing Unes /Jetuwcn Chevron und l'ennhurst: A
Functional Analysis of the Spending !'ower, Fedcrolisrn, and the Arhninistmtiue Stole,
H~ 'l'!<:x. L. l{i•:V. 11 ~J7, 1 ~12-11 (20tH) (discussing Va. lkp't. of Educ. v. llil<•y, 1Oli F.:ld
;)59 (1th Cir. 1ml7) (('n bane) (per curiam)). In Va. Dl']/t of !•;due. v. llil<·v. the Fourth
Circuit prohibitl·d J)()J•: intcrprl'taLions of the IDEA to trump Virginia's int<•rprl'tation.
/d. HL 1212. HowPver, Congn:ss had not ('Xplicitly- l'nLJ·u~tc·d tlw agl'ncy with cn•ating
L}](' details of tlw n:gulation. /d. at 1212-1 :L
162. Peter .J. Smith, l'cnnhurst, Clwvron, and the Spending l'ou•ror, 110 Y.\L!o: L .. J.
11 H7, 12:l5-:lf) (2001) (discussing pros and cons of' such an approach).
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interpreting the broad conditions set by Congress. 163 States
might also argue that this approach is an unconstitutional
delegation of congressional regulatory authority. But
delegation is permissible as long as Congress gives an
"intelligible principle" to guide agency rulemaking. 164 The
Supreme Court, unwilling to second guess most delegations,
has interpreted "intelligible principle" very broadly, 165
upholding even a delegation that simply required regulations
"in the public interest." 166 In fact, only two statutes have ever
violated this rule, both of which gave little or no guidance. 167
As long as Congress sets some broad educational goals-such
as a general standard that schools hire qualified, effective
teachers-then
the
delegation
would
probably
be
constitutionally permissible.
This proposal-using administrative law to give states a
more prominent voice in setting federal education policyencapsulates the emerging theories of federalism discussed
previously. In regards to the proposition that federalism is
obsolete, the administrative state offers a chance to rewrite the
structural elements of government. The national priorities for
education are still promulgated through federal agencies,
thereby accounting for the United States' uniform normative

16:l. S!'c id. at 1210. It would be a close question whether such an approach would
bl' constitutional. Reviewing precedent, Petl>r Smith notes: "It would not be
unreasonable to conclude, in light of general contract principles and the interests that
Chevron serves, that states should (absent thl' Bowen retroactivity problems described
ahovl') hl' hound even by agency interpretations that postdate the state's acceptance of
funds. Ell,ml,ntal notions of fairness for the state recipients give pause, however,
especially when one considers the hypotheticals of the agency's reversing its prior view
or the state's committing the grant funds in reliance on its own reasonable view, only
to learn later that the agency has a different (albeit reasonable) view. . . . [T]he
question is ... a close one." !d.
161. See Mistretta v. United States, 188 U.S. :l61, :n2 (1989) (''So long as Congress
'shall lay down by legislatiVl' act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislatiVl' power."' (quoting .J.W. Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. :l91, 109 (1928))).
165. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 5:11 U.S. 157, 17a (20(l1) (giving
examples of permissible intPlligible principles).
166. /d. at 171 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
167. !d. at 171 ("'n the history of the Court we have found the requisitl' 'intelligible
principle' lacking in only two statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance for
the exercise of discretion, and the other of which conferred authority to regulate the
entire economy on thl' basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the
economy by assuring 'fair competition."' (citing Pan. J{ef. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. :388
(19:l5); AL.A Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935))).
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desire for better elementary and secondary education. 1('K
Additionally, it permits regional or state experimentation until
a more cohesive national ideal is identified. 1c, 9 In regards to
empowerment and polyphonic federalism, the whole objective
of this approach is to further empower states while not
diminishing federal power, actually adding further playersindependent agencies-into the group of entities seeking to
solve educational deficiencies. 170 By empowering agencies to
set the specifics of federal education policy, the federal
government would appropriately set a stage for a dynamic
ongoing debate over education policy. This debate would allow
the federal and state governments to learn from each other 171
without the crippling necessity of cumbersome congressional
action to dramatically change course. 172

C.

Administrative Law Mechanisms for Increasing Polyphony

If Congress does increase the role of the DOE in setting
education policy, it is important for Congress to provide tools
for the agency to perform this task in a way that increases
state participation in setting national education policy. m This
article now proposes a senes of administrative-law
mechanisms that Congress could use to promote this
participation.
D.

Notice-and-comment rulemahing

Congress could enact a modified version of notice-andcomment rulemaking to specifically address state concerns. 174

lf1K FEI·:LEY & IWBIN. supra notl' G, at 11:, (discussing how "tlw Anwrican pl•opll'
... havl' a unifit•d political ilkntit.v.").
1G9. !d. at 117 ("[SJtate divl'rgem·l' from national norms, whilt• it may· prl'vail
during pt•riods of nonnatiw unct•rtainty. it ttltimatt•ly suppn•ssed once t.he national
position lwconws clear.").
170. See Schapiro. supm not" 7. at 2!i·1 ("JFJl'dl•ralism is about t.lw inlt•raction of
multiple indl'Jll'l1dl'nt voices.").
171. See id. at 10:l ("NCLll should allow stal<·s to learn from t•ach otht·r and from
the national govprnml·nf'). l'rof(•ssor Schapiro nott•s that "[tjlw national governnwnt
also can build on the hl'sl. prncticPs of the states." !d.
172. Sec supra notes 1 S5-H7 and accompanying !.t•xt (discussing how agt·ncit•s can
take action l'asier than Congn•ss).
17:l. 8ee l'indL·r. Sllpru note 10. at 15 (arguing that it was a fallacy to n•quin· !)()!<;
to l'nforcc NCLB curriculum standards without giving any "n•al guidant•t• about how to
dfl'ctivtdy t•nfmct• those provisions.").
171. l'rofPssor Ml'tzgcr suggl•sl.s that courts could achil'Vl' this goal bv "polic[ingJ
t.ht• distinction lll'twel'n lt•gislativt• and nonkgislative rul"s tightly, insisting on notit·t•-
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This would allow the federal government to consult with states
on national education policy. 175 Congress could require
agencies to hold special notice-and-comment periods just for
the states. 176 The DOE thus could avoid opening the issue up to
the whole public, while still addressing state concerns. This
procedure would be ideal for allowing states to participate in
setting the details of a reauthorized NCLB and also for
responding to state concerns in ongoing modifications of NCLB.
Moreover, by opening notice-and-comment procedure to local
governments or school districts as well, this approach would
refute the assertion that federal education policy silences the
voices of local governments. 177 Of course, like normal
administrative rulemaking, the federal government could still
drive the policy, since the final rule would need to be a "logical
outgrowth" of the originally proposed rule. 17X The DOE would
not have to side with the majority of states but would have to
explain its reasoning, 179 creating greater responsiveness than
currently realized through congressional process.
One criticism might be that burdensome procedures for
participating in agency rulemaking could stifle reform. 1~ 0 But
and-comment procedures whenever an agency interpretive rule or policy statement had
significant legal or practical effect on a state." Metzger, supra note 122, at 21 02-0::l. She
also suggests that "[a]lternatively, courts could strictly enforce notice and explanation
requirements, requiring that fedl,ral agencies carefully identify and justify the
pn'l'mptive or other dfects of a proposed rule on tlw states." !d. at 21 O:l.
17:). See, e.g, Susan H. Fuhrman, tess than Meets the /<;ye: Standards, Testin;;,
and Fear of Federal Control, in WHo's IN CHt\J{(;J<: IIEJU(I THE TANGLJW WEB OF
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 1 fi:l (Noel Epstein ed., 2001) (recommending that
"[sjtate and local policymakl,rs and educators should hl' consulted as part of the
development procl,ss" for federal policies).
176. Since notice and comment procedures are statutorily created, Con!-,'Tess can
create special procedun•s f(>r particular statutory n'giml,s. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000)
(creating special notice and comment procedures for Securities and Exchange
Commission review of Financial Industry f{cgulatory Authority rules). Research did
not find any current special notice and comment procedures for state participation.
177. llcisc, supra note 11, at 1:ll ("[T]hc education sector evidences a consistent
desire to decentralize educational policy-making authority, especially as it relates to
cllomentary and Sl'condary education.").
178. Natural Hes. Def. Council v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 110, 1:l7 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(applying thl' logical outgrowth t.l,st).
179. Motor Vehiele Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 16:-l U.S. 29, 1:1
(198:-l) (dPeiding an "agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts
found and thl~ choice madt~.'" (quoting Burlington Truck Lim~s v. United States, ::n1
U.S.156, 168(1962))).
180. Sec Sidm•y A. Shapiro & J{ichard W. Murphy, l~if{ht Thin;;s Americans Can't
Fi;;ure Out About Controllin;; Administrative Power, 61 AllMIN. L. HEV. 5, 8 (2009)
("Judicial efforts to make notice-and-comment meaningful have made this process very
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this procedure would be more flexible than formal rulemaking
or Congressional action, 1~ 1 especially for issues with the
potential for partisan gridlock. 1x2 A federal bill must garner the
approval of both congressional houses and the President before
becoming law. 1 ~J Requiring two governmental branches to alter
the law-or three if it is challenged in court-promotes
stability and hinders change. 1x4 Agency rulemaking, on the
other hand, moves much quicker. 1xs Too much f1uidity can, of
course, create a lack of clarity, but this approach would
actually promote clarity by providing a much-needed
mechanism for quickly modifying unclear or otherwise
inadequate rules.

E.

Judicial review of agency decisions

Allowing agencies to create specific guidelines for NCLB
would also increase judicial review of NCL13 regulations.
Although courts are highly deferential to agency decisions, 1X6
the APA imposes a standard of judicial review that is stricter
than constitutional constraints alone. 1X? Courts evaluate

burdt'nsoTne, IPading, according to n1any critics, to thl' notorious 'ossification' of agPlH.'Y
ndt>making ... ").
Jill. See Lars No;d1. !Jiuining Hcgu!at.ory Intent: The !'lace for a "/,egislutirJC
History" of' Agency Hules. f>l IL\S'I'IN<:S L .• J. 2ii:), 2~Hi (2000) (discussing "thl• n•lat.ivl'
ease of amt>nding a regulation through inf(>nnal ruh•making procedun·s. at lt'ast :~s
compared to tlw inertia and other difficultil•s l'ncountered hy Congn•ss"): Nicholas S.
hl,ppos. !Jej(•r-crl<'e to l'oliticul /)ccisiorunul!crs and the l're/('rrcd Scope o/ .Judicial
/leuiew. 88 Nw. U. L. Ht•;v. 296, :;2:-; ( nm:l) (suggesting agl,ncies can make fl·deral law
easi1•r than Congn•ss): Notes. '/'he .Judicial Hole in /Jef'ining l'roceduml Hequirements
jfn Agency Hulemaliing. Wi lli\IN. L. l{t•;v. 782. 7i:\ii (1971) ('Tlw n·latiw advantagr·s of
dficil•ncy, flexibility. and broad participation makt' infonnal rulemaking po·eferahle to
formal adjudication or formal rulL•making as a nwans of dl•vvloping lvgisi<ttiw facts
and thereby fot'mulat.ing administrative policivs.").
11l2. Sec f)illon IAW'suit, supra note :1 (discussing how Cong-n•ss was "stymied h\·
partisan strifl• oVl'r the [NCLBJ's l'l'lll'Wal").
18:L Zc·ppos. supra not.<• 1H 1, at. :\~H.
18·1. Cass It SunsLl•in. Constitutionalism J\j)er the Neu' /Jeul. 101 IL\HV. L. Rt•:v.
!J21. 't:Hi (1987).
180>. Sec i:eppos. supra note Jill. at :\28 ("While tlH• l\I'A-mon• :t<·curately. an
i\1'1\ vigorously intl•rpret.ed by the judiciary~·n•at.l's barril'I"S to agenc:-· action, agency
action need not go through tlw sanw cumbersonw procl•ss as a bill (bicam(•ralism and
pn:sentment) to IH•come htw.").
18ti. Sec Chevron. U.S.A .. Inc. v. Natural J{,•s. Dl.f'. Council. Inc., Hi7 U.S. s:n. 811lii (19tl1) (using a two-step test to dl'cidl· whl'thl'r to def<'r to <tdministr<tt.iVl' agl'ncv
interpretations of law).
li:\7. Sec fi U.S.C. ~ 70ti(2)(A) (reqniring courts to "hold nnlawfnl and s1·t asid,.
agPncy action. findings. and conclusions found to b1•-arbitrary. capricious. an abuse of'
discretion. or otlwrwisl' not in <tccon!anc<> with law").
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whether agency decisions are reasonable 1xx and not "arbitrary
or capricious." 1X') In some cases, courts even examine whether
an agency made a rational connection between the facts and its
decision. 190
Although often unsuccessful, alleging improper agency
action is currently one of the main ways states can oppose
NCLB. If the DOE was given more discretion, it would be
easier for states to usc this approach to oppose education
policies. Rather than mounting a constitutional challenge,
states could challenge DOE decisions as arbitrary and
capricious. This burden is tough to meet but would provide an
outer boundary on the DOE's discretion in setting education
policy. Congress could even require the DOE to support its
decisions with "substantial evidence." Either way, judicial
review of state complaints increases polyphony between state
and federal government because it increases the state voice in
setting NCLB regulations. To avoid overburdening the courtsand to allow the DOE to control the agenda-Congress could
limit the right of action to bring suit to state governments.
There are critics, however, of an expanded judicial role.
Much of this criticism is directed at proposals for the Supreme
Court to find that NCLB violates the spending power. 191 The
author agrees that this approach is unfavorable: it might
severely limit the voice of the federal government, decreasing
polyphony even in areas beyond education. 192 Moreover, the

1HH. Chcuron, c167 U.S. at H1cl-c15.
1H9. Sec Motor Vt;hicle Mfrs. i\ss'n v. State l•'arm Mut. i\uto. Ins. Co., 16:l U.S. 29,
1:1 (198:1) (applying the i\1'1\'s arbitrary and capricious review provision).
190. !d. at 1:1 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, :l71 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).
191. Compare Coulter M. Bump, Comment, Reuiuing the Coercion Test: A l'roposal
to l'reuent Federal Conditional Spending That /,caucs Children Behind, 76 U. COLO. L.
Rr:v. 521 (2005) (arguing the Court should revive a stricter analysis of ft;deral coercion

in order to limit NCLB), and Gina i\ustin, Note, Leaving Federalism Behind: How the
No Child Left Behind Act Usurps States' Rights, 27 T. ,JEFFEI{SON L. Rt:V. :5:37, :156
(2005) (arguing that NCLB "is inherently vagm; and ambiguous."), with Consiglio,
supra note 129, at :l69 (criticizing the unconstitutionality aq.,'l.mwnt and those like it
ht•cause "[tjhey do not point the way forward to correcting the long intractable problem
of im;quality in educational opportunities, hut insist that the flexibility and freedom
schools have enjoyed for decades is still the solution.").
192. Two
examples
of spending
clause
h;gislation
include
federal
antidiscrimination and child welfan• statutes. See i\nn Carey Juliano, The More You
Spend, the More You Saue: Can the Spending Clause Saue Federal Anti-Discrimination
/,aws~. 16 VILL. L. Ri•:v. 1111, 116:1 (2001) ("Two prime examples of anti-discrimination
Spending Clause k•gislation are Title VI and Title IX."); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
Uefrarning the /Jebate about the Socialization of Children: An l~nvironrnentalist
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federal government took control of education policy because
local control, by itself, had proved inadequate to improve
national academic achievement. 19 -' The proposal here avoids
these pitfalls by not requiring courts to make wide-sweeping
decisions about the scope of the Spending Clause just to strike
down an arbitrary education policy.

F.

Political accountability

Agencies may be even more accountable to the American
public than Congress is, for primarily four reasons. 194 First,
agencies are more open to participation by low-budget
lobbies. 195 Second, they can respond more quickly to public
opinion. 196 Third, they have regional offices with staffers who
live and work in local communities, giving them a better gauge
of on-the-ground concerns than lawmakers in Washington. 197
Finally, agencies arc subjected to presidential appointment and
removal, 19 x and presidential influence impresses state concerns
on agencies because of the important role state officials play in
presidential campaigns. 199 As evidence of this phenomenon,
since President Reagan, every president has "issued or at least
maintained an executive order requiring agencies specifically
to consider state and local government concerns when
regulating.•@()

l'urudigm, ~001 U. Ciil. LJ•:t:,\L F. i-\5. 1 ~() n.l ()9 ("Child wcdf'an• law providc>s manv
c>xamples of s]wnding clause nwasures, including Llw Adoption Assist:uH:<• and Child
Welfan· Act .... ").
J9:l. See Consiglio, supra note• 1~9, at :lf19 (arguing that to invalidate f('d<•ral
involvement in c>ducation polici<•s fails hc>cansP it dot•s not point t lw wa~; f(nwanl, but
relies on same> mechanisms that did not. work lwf(n·<·).
Hl·1. See Brian Callt' & Mark Sc:id('nf<·ld, Administmlil'e l~wc's l•l·derulism:
l'rcemption, /)e/cgation, and Agencies at the !~dge of Fcderall'ou•cr. ii7 Dllt<J<: L.•J. 19:l:l,
1979 (:lOOK) (analyzing tlw rPlative political accountability of legislatiVl', judicial. and
agency ]Jl'OCCSSl'S).
195. !d. at 19fi0, 191-\~.
19G. Id.
197. Sec Ml'lzg<•r, supm nott• 1 ~~- at ~07•1-7ii (discussing t lw proximity of regional
agenc~· offices to tlw stat"s as a rc>ason that agt•nciPs an• good cntitit•s to addn·ss
fc•dc>ralism concerns).
191-\. See U.S. CO:-.JST. art. II.~~. cl. ~ (recjttiring tlw l'rcsicb1t to appoint inf(•rior
officc>rs): Myers v. Unitt•d StaLPs. ~~~ U.S. !'i~ (19~()) (holding that tlw l'rc>sidc•nt has
power to l'emove executive branch officials, l'Vl'll though Llw Constitution dot•s not
Pxplicitly address n•moval).
199. Sec Galll' & SPicknfl'ld. suprrt note 19·1. at HlH:l (making this argunwnt
regarding pn'sidential influence on agc,ncit•s).
200. lei. at HlH:l n.210 (citing P.g., Ex('l:. Ord<•r No. l:l,l:l~. :l C.F.Il. ~0(1 (2000),
reprinted in ii U.S.C. ~ ()01 (200fi): Ext•c·. ()l'([pr No. 12,:!72, 17 1<\•d. llc•g. :l0.9ii~) (,Julv
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Allowing and tracking state experimentation
Another benefit of using administrative law and
independent agencies as the vehicle for reforming NCLB is the
potential for the reauthorization to take greater account of
diverse state education initiatives. As noted, Congress already
requires the DOE to account for some state experimentation by
allowing for state waivers. 201 Additionally, the DOE 1s
responsible for writing policy letters to the states and
monitoring state compliance. 202 These factors make the DOE
more aware of the state concerns about education policy. The
DOE will be-and already is-counseling Congress about the
reauthorization of NCLB,2° 3 but the agency should be the
conduit for setting many of the standards for the new law.
The DOE should be encouraged to embrace experimentation
in state policy and be given leeway to do so. 204 This could take
the form of waivers. 205 For example, the DOE could grant a
state a waiver for students who are not at risk in exchange for
increased accountability in regard to disadvantaged
students. 206 Waivers are, of course, criticized for diluting
accountability by allowing states to avoid consequences, 207 and
they are only a temporary remedy to the broader problem of

11. 1982)).
201. 20 U.S.C. ~ 7861 (2002). According to NCLB: '"Except as provided in
subsection (c) of this section, the Secretary [of Educationj may waive any statutory or
regulatory requirenwnt of this chapter for a State educational agency, local educational
agency, Indian tribe, or school through a local educational agency, that-(1) receives
funds undPr a program authorized by this chapter; and (2) requests a waiver under
subsection (b) of this sl;ction." !d. at~ 7861 (a).
202. See NCLB l'olicy Letters to States, ED.nov, www2.ed.gov/policy
/elsec/guid/statl;ldters/index.html (last modified Apr. 21, 2009) (listing DO!~ policy
letters to states and showcases approved state accountability plans).
20:1. Dillon Hearing, supra notl' 1 fi![ (discussing a congressional hearing where the
Secretary of Education briefly discussed the planned reauthorization of NCLB).
201. See Consiglio, supra note 129, at :l70 (noting that "the Bush administration's
refusal to engage in any substantive negotiation with states requesting waivers of
certain provisions of NCLB sent a chilling messagl' that was counterproductive to
NCLB's goals.").
20fi. Cf. Matthew D. Knepper, Comment, Shooting for the Moon: The Innocence of

the No Child Left /3ehind Act's One Hundred Percent Proficiency Goal and Its
Consequences, fi:l ST. LOUIS U. L .•J. H99, 92:l (2009) (noting that "since NCLB's
inception, the Secretary has been anything hut willing to grant such waivers.").
206. Mauricl~ !{. Dyson, De Facto Segregation & Group nlindness: l'roposals for
Narrow Tailoring under a New Viable State Interest In Pies v. Seattle School District,
77 UMKC L. i{EV. 697, 7:l:l (2009).
207. See, e.g., Pinder, supra note 10, at :l5 ('"[MJany states have used loopholes and
waivers to dilute the impact of NCLB's accountability provisions.").
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states being excluded from participating in setting national
education policy. 20 x Many of the proposals discussed elsewhere
in this article will help eliminate the risk that the new law will
be watered-down through too many waivers.
Congress also could address another key concern of NCLB
critics-states lowering their standards-simply by granting
the DOE more discretion regarding state educational plans.
The Secretary of Education already subjects state standards to
peer and agency review, 209 but the Secretary's authority to
deny approval of state plans is so limited that it is
ineffective. 210 The Secretary cannot put conditions on its
approval of the plan, so the DOE can't specify any particular
academic assessment or require the state to add to or remove
any part of their plan. 211 By giving the DO I<: greater discretion
to reject inadequate plans, Congress would increase states'
incentive to enact better plans. In the language of federal
theory, standard setting has become too state-driven; greater
discretion for the DOE would increase polyphony, just as giving
states a greater voice in setting core NCLB regulations would
increase the polyphony of that process.
G.

Transparency in rulemaking

An additional benefit of using agencies to formulate more
specific guidelines of NCLB is that agency rulemaking,
especially under the regime of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), is likely more transparent than the legislative
process. 212 FOTA, part of the APA, requires agencies to provide
a wide variety of documents to the public. 211 Even apart from
FOIA, because they face judicial review for "arbitrary and
capncwus" decisions, agencies have a greater incentive than
201-i. Do;m, supm noll• i\2, at 227.
209. 20 U.S.C. ~ ();l] 1(P)(l) (21)(H)). According to tlw statuks. tlw i'lP<'l'l'lar:--· shall:
"(/\) establish a pl'l'r-rPviPw pmn•ss to assist in tlw n·view of StaLl• plans: (ll) appoint

individuals to the ]JPPr-rcviPw process who are n•pn•sl'nt.ativl' of parl'nts. ll'achl'rs.
State- l'ducational agc•nci<•s, an<l local Pducational agPncil's, and who an· familiar with
educational standards, assessnwnts, accountability. the lH'l'ds of low-p<•rforming
schools. and otlwr l'ducational nl'<,ds of stud<•nt s .
210. /d.
211.

!d.

at~

6:n 1(<·)(1)(F).

Sec Calle• & Sc•idc•nfeld, supra noll' Hll, at 19:)1\ ("!Tilw ag<•ncy proc<·,.;s likely
is more transpan•nt than tlw ll'gislativ<· pro<·<·ss primarily IH'caus" tlw costs of gaining
access to agpncy staff nwmlwrs who can Pxplain tlw agency's dPiih<•rations is lowpr
than tht• co,.;t to gain acct•ss to h•gislators.'').
212.

21:l.

G LJ.S.C.

~

GG2 (2009).
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Congress to explain the rationale behind their decisionmaking.214 Agencies do not have the same incentive as
Congress to use opacity as a shield against dissatisfied
voters. 215
Moreover, it is, as a rule, less expensive to gain access to
agency staffers than federal legislators. 216 Cash-strapped state
lobbies 217 have greater potential for participation in agency
rulemaking than through costly efforts to influence
Congress. 21 x And because agencies have a greater incentive to
explain their rationales, state lobbies can be better informed. 219
For this reason, agencies are likely the most effective federal
vehicle for ensuring that states have access to influence and
understand the rationales behind new NCLB regulations,
rather than just having to deal with the outcomes. 220

VIII. CONCLUSION
It is clear that NCLB needs to be reformed. The federal
government is often unresponsive to state concerns, so the
states have resorted to lowering their standards to comply with
the law. Congress has been exceedingly slow to respond to the
evidence that some parts of NCLB are not working, despite the
fact that there remain many questions about how the law
211. Sec Galk· & S,;idenf,,Jd, supra note 191, at 1960 ("[Ajg,;ncy staff members
facing hard look judicial revi,;w must know all the potential objections to a rule the
agency is proposing and obtain as much information about those objections as possible
to facilitate the defense of any rule if it is challenged in court.").
21 fi. Sec id. (touching on this aspect of agency transparPncy).
216. /cl.at19fiH.
217. States inde,;d are facing seven; financial difficulties. See Amy Merrick, States
Sink m
Dcncfits Hole,
WALL ST. .).,
Feb.
18,
2010,
available at
http://onlim•. wsj.com/artide/SB I 000112105271H701:l9HH01fi7G071 H7:lG17:l72fi 11.html
(discussing a i'Pw CentPr on tlw States study that showed status were facing extreme
financial burdens from their promis,;d employment benefits).
218. Sec Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David
Schocnbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 7i-11 (1999) (contrasting the costs of participating
in agency rulemaking with influpncing congrPssional d(;cisionmaking).
219. See Calle & Seidenfdd, supra note 191, at 1961 (arguing that in regards to
transpan;ncy, "agencies outperform thPir rivals, as they offer more sourcps of insight
about their ,jpcisionmaking as well as information about how to inlluenc(; it'').
220. Sec id. ("[Ajlthough the public may be more awan; of statutes or Suprcm(;
Court dPcisions than of ohscun; f,•dcral regulations, true transparency entails not only
knowledge of outcomes hut also knowledg'~ of the rationales on which decisionmakers
rely and the ability to influence the decision maker's deliberations."). Scholars note that
in regards to transpan;ncy "agencies outperform their rivals, as they offer more sources
of insight about their dPcisionmaking as well as information about how to inlluenn; it."
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should balance the state and federal roles in setting education
policy.
Emerging theories of federalism arc helpful in the task of
re-imagining NCLB and should inform Congress in the
reauthorization. These theories support a strong federal role in
education. But they also promote greater empowerment of
state governments, allowing coordination and competition
between both levels of government, for the sake of the nation's
education. With this theoretical underpinning, the role of
Congress is to look for ways to promote federal and state
polyphony in setting education law.
The best way to achieve this balance-to maintain federal
control and increase the voice of the states-is to delegate more
responsibility to federal agencies, while enacting special
mechanisms meant to increase the voice of the states. Congress
should a1low federal agencies to set many of the specifics of
NCLB's reauthorization, while also allowing for easier judicial
review for state challenges to agency decisions, special noticeand-comment procedures for states, and procedures for
encouraging state experimentation. Using agencies and these
mechanisms,
Congress
can
ensure
that
the
next
reauthorization of NCLB remains flexible enough to address
ongoing concerns and promotes the empowerment of states.
Future scholarship and research should continue to explore
additional ways Congress can usc administrative law to
improve federal and state interaction in setting education
policy and beyond.

